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I. INTRODUCTION 
Whether an Ohioan with a felony conviction can be considered for 
jury service may well depend on where he or she lives in the state or the 
judge presiding at trial, rather than the dictates of Ohio law. By statute, 
Ohio permits those with felony convictions to serve on juries upon the 
completion of any parole or community control sanctions that may have 
been imposed. 1 This article is not concerned with this settled law but 
rather the dramatic unevenness of its implementation, as Ohio courts of 
common pleas, and even individual judges, vary widely in whether they 
abide by or even recognize this statutory directive. For example, the 
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas systematically excluded any 
individual with a felony conviction from jury service for over 20 years, 
ending only in 2020. 2 The Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas 
seems to accurately promote the state law in its Local Rules, but it is 
unclear the extent to which individual judges or attorneys understand that 
directive. 3 The Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, by contrast, 
currently provides either vague or clear misstatements of the law in its 
website and Local Rules. 4 
Part II of this article clarifies the current state of the law in Ohio 
regarding juror eligibility for those with felony convictions. Part III 
examines juror selection in the courts of common pleas in Ohio’s three 
largest counties, mentioned above—Cuyahoga (Cleveland), Hamilton 
(Cincinnati), and Franklin (Columbus)—and their disparate approaches to 
this issue. Part IV discusses the legal implications of excluding jurors with 
felony convictions, not only as a violation of Ohio law, but also as a 
violation of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury from a fair cross section 
of the community and the Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process 
and equal protection. Part V offers practical solutions that courts, the 
Adult Parole Authority, and others can implement to address these 
1. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2967.16(C)(1) (West 2020) (“ Except as provided in division
(C)(2) of this section, the following prisoners or person shall be restored to the rights and privileges  
forfeited by a conviction: (a) A prisoner who has served the entire prison term that comprises or is 
part of the prisoner’s sentence and has not been placed under any post-release control sanctions; (b) 
A prisoner who has been granted a final release or termination of post-release control by the adult 
parole authority pursuant to division (A) or (B) of this section; (c) A person who has completed the 
period of a community control sanction or combination of community control sanctions, as defined 
in section 2929.01 of the Revised Code, that was imposed by the sentencing court.”). 
2. See discussion infra Part III.A.
3. See discussion infra Part III.B.
4. See discussion infra Part III.C.
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concerns.  These solutions would preserve the rights of eligible Ohioans 
to serve on a jury along with defendants’ rights to be tried by a jury of 
their peers. 
II. CURRENT LAW IN OHIO REGARDING JUROR ELIGIBILITY.
Article V, § 4 of the Ohio Constitution grants the Ohio General 
Assembly the “power to exclude from the privilege of voting, or of being 
eligible to office, any person convicted of a felony.”5 Pursuant to this 
authority, the General Assembly enacted Ohio Rev. Code § 2961.01, 
which provides that a person convicted of a felony under the laws of Ohio 
“is incompetent to be an elector or juror or to hold an office of honor, 
trust, or profit” unless the person’s conviction is reversed or annulled, or 
the person is granted a full pardon. 6 
Ohio Rev. Code § 2967.16(C)(1) then restores civil rights—
including the right to serve on a jury—to those convicted of a felony once 
the person has completed probation or community control sanctions that 
may have been imposed. 7 Specifically, the law restores “the rights and 
privileges forfeited by a conviction” to a prisoner who has completed his 
or her prison term “and has not been placed under any post-release control 
sanctions,” who “has been granted a final release or termination of post-
release control by the adult parole authority,” or “who has completed the 
period of a community control sanction or combination of community 
control sanctions . . . that was imposed by the sentencing court.”8 The law 
was first enacted in 1994, but at that time did not contain language 
5. OHIO CONST. art. V, § 4; see also OHIO CONST. art. I, § 2 (“ no special privileges or
immunities shall ever be granted, that may not be altered, revoked, or repealed by the general  
assembly”). 
6. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2961.01(A)(1) (West 2020); see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2313.17(B)(1) (West 2020) (a good cause to challenge a person called as a juror is that “ the person 
has been convicted of a crime that by law renders the person disqualified to serve on a jury”); 
§ 2945.25(I) (a juror in a criminal case may be challenged on the ground that “ he has been convicted
of a crime that by law disqualifies him from serving on a jury”); OHIO R. CRIM. P. 24(C)(1) (a juror 
in a criminal case may be challenged on the ground that “ the juror has been convicted of a crime 
which by law renders the juror disqualified to serve on a jury”). 
7. See State v. Dawson, 2015-Ohio-488, ¶¶ 21–23 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015). A “ community
control sanction” is defined as “ a sanction that is not a prison term and that is described in 
section 2929.15, 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code or a sanction that is not a jail term 
and that is described in section 2929.26, 2929.27, or 2929.28 of the Revised Code. ‘Community 
control sanction’ includes probation if the sentence involved was imposed for a felony that was 
committed prior to July 1, 1996, or if the sentence involved was imposed for a misdemeanor that was 
committed prior to January 1, 2004”; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.01(E) (West 2020); see also id. 
§ 2961.01(C)(1); id. § 2967.01(P).
8. OHIO REV. CODE § 2967.16(C)(1) (West 2020).
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restoring juror eligibility to those with felony convictions. 9 In 1996, the 
law was updated to reflect the restoration of benefits, including to those 
who committed a felony prior to the 1996 amendment. 10 
As described by an Ohio appellate court, §§ 2961.01 and 2967.16 
should be read “together so as to give effect to both” as follows:  
R.C. 2961.01, first enacted in 1953, provided one manner in which a 
convicted felon may have the right to serve as a juror restored. That 
manner was to obtain a pardon. The legislature later drafted 
R.C. 2967.16, providing additional ways in which convicted felons may 
have various rights and privileges restored, including the right to serve 
as a juror. Read together, R. C. 2961.01 and 2967.16 provide that a 
convicted felon may have the right to serve as a juror restored by 
obtaining a pardon or by the terms outlined in R.C. 2967.16(C)(1).11 
Under § 2967.16(C)(1), a person who has been convicted of a felony is 
eligible for jury service upon the completion of any parole or community 
control sanctions that may have been imposed. 12 The General Assembly 
also included language referring to the restoration of such rights and 
privileges when one has satisfied those statutory conditions in Ohio Rev. 
Code § 2953.33(A)—regarding a person who has had his or her record of 
conviction sealed—and § 2967.17(B)—regarding termination of 
jurisdiction over a particular sentence or prison term by the Adult Parole 
Authority for administrative reasons. 13 The Ohio Attorney General has 
noted that “[t]he use of such language in these statutes demonstrates that 
9. Ohio Att’y Gen., Op. No. 2006-031, at 2-295 n.6, https://www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/
getattachment/9e4a7fcf-37ab-40b4-92a3-4fea50986991/2006-031.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZWZ8-
3XL8] [hereinafter Ohio AG Opinion]. 
10. Id. The law was updated most recently on October 29, 2018, in Am. Sub. S.B. 66 § 1 at
31–33. 
11. Dawson, 2015-Ohio-488, ¶ 22.
12. See Ohio AG Opinion, supra note 12, at 2-291 (“ R.C. 2967.16(C)(3) restores the privilege 
of serving as a juror on a petit jury to a person who was convicted of a felony under the laws of Ohio 
prior to, or on or after July 1, 1996, and who has completed his probation or a period of one or more 
community control sanctions.”); see generally Ohio Trial Court Jury Use and Management Standards 
adopted by the Supreme Court of Ohio on August 16, 1993, Standard 4 (“ [a]ll persons should be 
eligible for jury service except those who . . .[h]ave been convicted of a felony and have not had their 
civil rights restored”). 
13. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.33(A) (West 2020) (“ An order issued under section 2953.37 
of the Revised Code to expunge the record of a person’s conviction or, except as provided in division 
(G) of section 2953.32 of the Revised Code, an order issued under that section to seal the record of a 
person’s conviction restores the person who is the subject of the order to all rights and privileges not 
otherwise restored by termination of the sentence or community control sanction or by final release 
on parole or post-release control.”); id. § 2967.17(B)(2) (“ Any person granted an administrative 
release under this section may subsequently apply for a commutation of sentence for the purpose of 
regaining the rights and privileges forfeited by conviction,” subject to certain exceptions). 
4
Akron Law Review, Vol. 54 [2021], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol54/iss2/2
2020] EX-OFFENDERS AND JURY SERVICE  241 
the General Assembly intended to restore a felon’s rights and privileges  
when the felon satisfies any of the conditions set forth in R.C. 
2967.16(C).”14 
While “collateral sanctions” such as disqualification from jury 
service are less visible than incarceration, “their consequences to felons 
may be equally profound” for reintegration. 15 For instance, allowing those 
with felony convictions to take part in the judicial process legitimizes the 
law and likely facilitates law-abiding conduct. 16 Those convicted of 
felonies who served on a jury often find the experience validating and 
transformative, a “recognition of their reformation.”17 Jury exclusion, on 
the other hand, “impedes the ability of felons to transition back into 
society as they are denied a stake in what happens in their communities.”18 
In addition, the absence of “those with direct experience of the 
criminal justice system” is a detriment to juries, since the workings of the 
system “are often not intuitive.”19 For example, those with felony 
convictions may better understand common factors of wrongful 
conviction, such as why someone would falsely confess to a crime he or 
she did not commit. 20 
14. Ohio AG Opinion, supra note 12, at 2-298.
15. Christopher Uggen, Jeff Manza & Melissa Thompson, Citizenship, Democracy, and the
Civic Reintegration of Criminal Offenders, ANNALS, AAPSS 281, 296, 303–04 (May 2006), citing 
Jeremy Travis, Invisible punishment: An instrument of social exclusion, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: 
THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT, ed. Marc Mauer and Meda Chesney-
Lind, 15, (2002); James M. Binnall, Sixteen Million Angry Men: Reviving A Dead Doctrine to 
Challenge the Constitutionality of Excluding Felons from Jury Service, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 1, 
22 (2009). See also Uggen et al., supra note 17, at 303–04. 
16. See, e.g., James M. Binnall, Felon-Jurors in Vacationland: A Field Study of
Transformative Civic Engagement in Maine, 71 ME. L. REV. 71, 88–96 (2018) (detailing a study 
finding that Maine’s lack of felon exclusion helped “ build a former offender’s self-concept, provide 
pro-social roles, and promote civic immersion tend to promote criminal desistance”); Tom R. 
Tyler, Does the American Public Accept the Rule of Law? The Findings of Psychological Research 
on Deference to Authority, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 661, 661 (2007); see also KENNETH L. KARST, 
BELONGING TO AMERICA—EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION 4 (1989) (“ The most 
heartrending deprivation of all is the inequality of status that excludes people from full membership 
in the community, degrading them by labeling them as outsiders, denying them their very selves.”). 
17. James M. Binnall, Summonsing Criminal Desistance: Convicted Felons’ Perspectives on
Jury Service, 43 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 4, 15 (2018). 
18. Amanda L. Kutz, A Jury of One’s Peers: Virginia’s Restoration of Rights Process and Its
Disproportionate Effect on the African American Community, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2109, 2135 
(2005). 
19. Anna Roberts, Casual Ostracism: Jury Exclusion on the Basis of Criminal Convictions, 98 
MINN. L. REV. 592, 606 (2013). 
20. Id. at 609. In Ohio, low-level felonies include nonviolent offenses such as forgery, theft,
receiving stolen property, or failure to pay child support. See generally Looking Forward: A 
Comprehensive Plan for Criminal Justice Reform in Ohio, ACLU OF OHIO & OHIO JUST. & POL’Y 
CTR. (Mar. 2016). 
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Felon exclusion from jury service creates even more “glaring racial 
disparities” than felon disenfranchisement, including “[r]educing the 
representation of black men on juries by thirty percent[.]”21 This exclusion 
prevents communities of color from participating in jury service because 
“the rate of black and Hispanic incarceration for felonies [is] several times 
higher than the same rate among white defendants.”22 Such exclusion 
“belies the democratic legitimacy of juries as adjudicative bodies 
representing the totality” of the community. 23 The exclusion of those with 
criminal records risks “exacerbating racial disparity within the jury 
system,” thus undermining “the perceived impartiality of the justice 
system and, at the most fundamental level, the rule of law.”24 
In enacting Ohio Rev. Code § 2967.16(C)(1), the Ohio General 
Assembly decided that it was more important to have a representative jury 
than it was to keep all those with felony convictions from jury service.25 
This law sets Ohio apart from certain other states who opted to keep those 
with felony convictions permanently ineligible, even at the expense of a 
more representative jury. 26 This legislation follows the pattern of the Ohio 
21. Brian C. Kalt, The Exclusion of Felons From Jury Service, 53 AM. U.L. REV. 65, 113–14 
(2003); see also Christopher Uggen, Ryan Larson & Sarah Shannon, 6 Million Lost Voters: State-
Level Estimates of Felony Disenfranchisement, SENT’G PROJECT, 3 (2016) (“ One in 13 African 
Americans of voting age is disenfranchised, a rate more than four times greater than that of non-
African Americans.”), http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/6-Million-
Lost-Voters.pdf [https://perma.cc/94JR-TXLT].  
22. Juan R. Sánchez, A Plan of Our Own: The Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s Initiative to
Increase Jury Diversity, 91 TEMP. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 12–13 (2019) (discussing national statistics); 
Sharion Scott, Justice in the Jury: The Benefits of Allowing Felons to Serve on Juries in Criminal 
Proceedings, 57 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 225, 236–37 (2018) (“ [M]any modern day laws limit or 
forbid the inclusion of former felons on juries, eliminating a large number of blacks that have the 
potential to serve.”). 
23. Ashley Alexander, Banned from the Jury Box: Examining the Justifications and
Repercussions of Felon Jury Exclusion in the District of Columbia, 57 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 11, 17 
(2020) (discussing the disproportionate racial impact of felony-juror exclusion in D.C.). 
24. Roberts, supra note 19, at 605, quoting Kevin R. Johnson, Hernandez v. Texas: Legacies
of Justice and Injustice, 25 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 153, 158 (2005) (mentioning “ disqualification 
of felons” as one of the mechanisms that bars “ disproportionate numbers of Latina/os from serving 
on juries”). 
25. See Ohio AG Opinion, supra note 12.
26. In some circumstances, a state may pass a law that excludes all those with felony
convictions from juries, even if that law has a disparate impact. However, rational basis is not 
sufficient to overcome a fair cross section violation. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 534 (1975) 
(a violation of the fair cross section requirement of the Sixth Amendment “ cannot be overcome on 
merely rational grounds.”). To overcome a fair cross section violation, the state must present  
“ weightier reasons” that justify the impact on the composition of the jury. Id. 
6
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General Assembly’s other efforts to restore rights and privileges in recent 
years to those with prior convictions. 27 
The numbers of those affected are significant: more than 20,000 
inmates are released from custody in Ohio every year. 28 In total, only 
about 31,000 of those released throughout those years are still on some 
form of post-release control. 29 As of 2018, “[a]n estimated 994,000 
Ohioans are living with a felony conviction—approximately one in eleven 
adults in the state . . . .”30 
III. HOW COURTS ARE IMPLEMENTING THE LAW.
This article’s concern is not with the law itself but with the dramatic 
unevenness of its implementation, to the extent that courts in the most 
populous counties in the state have been, to varying degrees, defying the 
law for years. 
A jury commission or trial judge in a particular county cannot ignore 
state law and, on his or her own accord, prohibit those with felony 
convictions whose rights have been restored from serving on juries. By so 
doing, such a prohibition causes a racial and sex-based disparity that 
primarily impacts African-American men in the affected counties.31 It 
also creates a disparity between those with felony convictions whose 
rights have been restored and who live in counties with different juror 
eligibility practices. There is no compelling, or even rational, 
governmental reason for treating jury eligibility for those with felony 
27. See, e.g., Fatima Hussein, Kasich Signs “Ban the Box” into Law, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER,
May 15, 2015 (“ Ohio Gov. John Kasich on Tuesday signed into law a bill that will bar public 
employers from including on job applications questions concerning an applicant’s criminal  
background.”); Joseph R. “ Randy” Klammel, Ohio SB 66 Expands Expungement Eligibility – But It 
Truly Does Much More, OHIO ST. B. ASS’N, Dec. 28, 2018 (“ In summary, expungement is now 
available to persons with nonviolent, nonsexual misdemeanors and/or felony offenses of the fourth 
and fifth degree. SB 66 allows for expungement review for a person with up to five felonies of the 
fourth or fifth degree.”). 
28. OHIO DEP’T REHAB. & CORR., 2020 Annual Report, at 19,
https://drc.ohio.gov/Portals/0/ODRC%20FY2020%20Annual%20Report%202%202%281%29.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HA2M-S72U]. 
29. Id. at 41.
30. Michael Shields & Pamela Thurston, Wasted Assets: The Cost of Excluding Ohioans with 
a Record from Work, POL’Y MATTERS OHIO AND OHIO JUST. & POL’Y CTR. (Dec. 18, 2018). 
31. Sarah K.S. Shannon, Christopher Uggen, Jason Schnittker, Melissa Thompson, Sara
Wakefield & Michael Massoglia, The Growth, Scope, and Spatial Distribution of People with Felony 
Records in the United States, 1948-2010, 54 DEMOGRAPHY 1795, 1805; Kalt, supra note 21, at 113–
14 (“ Reducing the representation of black men on juries by thirty percent without dissent is difficul t  
to imagine, but felon exclusion does just that.”).  
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convictions differently from county to county, even if a jury commission 
is acting entirely in good faith and simply misunderstands the law. 32 
According to their Local Rules, at least some county courts in Ohio 
appear to follow the state law that permits those with felony convictions 
to serve on juries once they have completed their sentence and community 
control. 33 Numerous disparities remain, however. As discussed below, the 
three most populous counties in Ohio, for example, have either 
inconsistently applied the law, or consistently flouted the law, by 
disqualifying from jury service anyone who has been convicted of a 
felony, regardless of how long ago the conviction took place or whether 
that individual has completed community control sanctions.34 
A. Cuyahoga County’s jury selection process. 
For at least the prior 22 years, the practice of the Cuyahoga County 
Common Pleas Court Jury Commission administrators had been to 
remove all potential jurors with felony convictions. 35 Starting around the 
beginning of 2020, Cuyahoga County updated its summons form and 
website to inform jurors of the correct state law: “You are disqualified 
32. See Garcia-Dorantes v. Warren, 801 F.3d 584, 604 (6th Cir. 2015) (“ [B]ecause the glitch
was inadvertent, no state interest was advanced by the computer error and subsequent  
underrepresentation of minorities in the jury venire.”). 
33. See, e.g., Lucas County L.R. 7.02(B) (2019) (listing as ineligible those who “ are convicted
felons whose rights have not been restored”); Scioto County L.R. XVI(C)(1)(e) (2004) (listing as  
ineligible those who “ [h]ave been convicted of a felony and have not had their civil rights restored”); 
Summit County L.R. 24.04(A)(5) (“ Pursuant to R.C. 2961.01, any person convicted of a felony under 
the laws of this state or any other state or the United States, unless the conviction is reversed or 
annulled, is incompetent to serve as a juror, excepting those persons who have been convicted under 
Ohio law and incarcerated under Ohio law and have had the restoration of their rights restored 
pursuant to R.C. 2967.16. Pursuant to such section, those persons who have been granted a final 
release by the Ohio Parole Authority, as otherwise provided in R.C. 2967.16, are competent to serve 
as jurors in Ohio. This section is applicable only to those persons convicted under Ohio law and 
incarcerated in Ohio institutions and are otherwise restored to their rights pursuant to R.C 2967.16.”). 
34. See discussion infra Part III. Even federal courts in Ohio have been confused on this issue.
While some courts have properly referenced the rights of those convicted of a felony as discussed in 
Ohio Revised Code §§ 2961.01 and 2967.16, see Lumpkin v. United States, No. 1:15 CR 317, 2018 
WL 467515, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 18, 2018) (“ when Devine was released from prison in June of 
2006, her civil rights to vote, hold public office, and serve on a jury were automatically restored”), 
others have improperly cited § 2961.01 without considering how § 2967.16 restores certain rights. 
See Jones v. Bradshaw, 489 F. Supp. 2d 786, 810 (N.D. Ohio 2007) (“ Under Ohio law, a juror who 
has been convicted of a felony cannot serve as a juror absent a full pardon.”); see also Hanna v. Ishee, 
No. C-1:03-CV-801, 2009 WL 485487, at *15 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 26, 2009) (citing Jones, 489, F. Supp. 
2d at 810). 
35. The Jury Room, On The Record: The Podcast of the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas
Court, at 4:53 (Apr. 1, 2018), https://www.buzzsprout.com/99872 [https://perma.cc/7MCJ-MM8Z] 
(“ If you’re a felon, you’re excused.”). 
8
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from service if you have been convicted of a felony and are currently on 
probation or are serving a community control sanction.”36 The Cuyahoga 
Court of Common Pleas Local Rules still do not reference how a felony 
conviction affects juror eligibility. 37 
At a pretrial hearing in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common 
Pleas, in State v. Sowell, Cuyahoga C.P. No. 2011-1921 (June 1, 2011), 
three court officials testified about the system that they used to select 
potential jurors: Gregory M. Popovich, the Court Administrator for the 
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas; Colleen Kelly, an employee 
for the Jury Commission; and Paul Ley, the Assistant Director of 
Information Services for the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. 
Mr. Popovich stated that the County selects potential jurors from a 
single source—the voter registration list. 38 He explained that through a 
series of “several random draws” performed by software designed by a 
court employee, the list of potential jurors for a given week is generated.39 
That list is generated every Tuesday. 40 
The Jury Commission then mails a jury summons to each potential 
juror. 41 The summons asks for personal and demographic information 
including “name, birth date, age, address, city, zip, telephone number, 
home, cell, work, occupation, employer, married, single, divorced, 
separated, widowed, spouse’s occupation, spouse’s employer, can you 
read, speak and understand English.”42 In another section of the summons, 
it asks whether the individual has served on a jury within the last two 
years, and “if there’s a felony conviction and if you’re over the age of 75 
and you’re choosing not to serve.”43 
Colleen Kelly, an employee for the Jury Commission, testified 
next. 44 Her job duties included “answering the phones, calls from people 
that do get summonses . . . .”45 Ms. Kelly noted that if potential jurors are 
older than 75, they were not required to serve and are automatically 
36. CUYAHOGA CTY. CT. COM. PL., Jury Duty (emphasis original),
http://cp.cuyahogacounty.us/internet/Jury%20Duty.aspx#3 [https://perma.cc/WDH4-QUN8] (click 
“ Who is exempt or disqualified from jury duty?” under FAQs). 
37. Cuyahoga County C.P. L.R. 35.0.
38. Transcript of Trial at 1111–12, State v. Sowell, No. 2011-1921 (Cuyahoga Com. Pl., June 
1, 2011); see also id. at 1111 (“ We just summon people that are registered voters.”). 
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1113.
41. Id. at 1116–17.
42. Id. at 1117.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1121.
45. Id.
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granted a health waiver without the need for a doctor’s note. 46 She entered 
an “H” in the system for these individuals. 47 
She went on to explain the following: 
[A]fter Tuesday’s draw, I run a list of what we call felons, and then I 
check them against the Sheriff’s Department database, and then I mark 
them and put an “F” in there for felon. 
And then a lot of them call in and say, “Hey, I have a felony,” so they’re 
automatically taken out.48 
Ms. Kelly described other types of circumstances that allow or require a 
potential juror to be excused or receive a postponement of service.49 She 
testified that her office handles these excuses and postponements without 
judicial involvement. 50 
Paul Ley, the Assistant Director of Information Services for the 
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, designed the jury selection 
software in or about 1998. 51 He described the process by which the court 
selected potential jurors. Each year, the Jury Commission receives the 
entire list of registered voters from the Board of Elections. 52 From that 
list, the Jury Commission 
[G]rab[s] what we think we need for a full year . . . .So say we get 
50,000 jurors. That’s going to do our needs for a whole year. We get that 
file and randomly draw those 50,000 jurors. 
And then from there, every Tuesday we draw what we think we need for 
that next week for jurors. Typically, you know, we try to get 200 jurors 
in. So we do another random draw based on that 50,000 jurors. 
From there, the jurors check in, do respond and actually show. They are 
placed on panels after that. The judges call down for panels, randomly 
drawn panels.53 
Mr. Ley explained that all the excuses are funneled through the judge 
and the court, except for the ones that are permitted by statute. 54 People 
over age 75, with previous juror service within two years, and “a felony” 
46. See id. at 1121–22.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1122.
49. Id. at 1122–25.
50. Id. at 1125.
51. Id. at 1129.
52. Id. at 1132.
53. Id. at 1131.
54. Id. at 1135.
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were excused without any judicial intervention. 55 Mr. Ley went on to 
explain how the court verifies these excuses. 56 Felony convictions are 
confirmed with the Sherriff’s database described by Ms. Kelly, and the 
court also has its own database, the CJIS application, which allows them 
to check for convictions on the court’s docket. 57According to Mr. Ley, a 
felony conviction at any point in one’s life automatically renders a person 
ineligible for jury service. 58 Potential grand jury members, as well as 
municipal court venires, 59 were also selected in the same manner. 60 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court concluded that “it’s 
been clear from the testimony here that the draw of the jurors from the 
community for this particular case has been no different than any other 
case. As a matter of fact, the same procedures were used as for the policy 
for general juries in this jurisdiction.”61 
Accordingly, until the changes in early 2020, there was no 
representation of those with felony convictions in Cuyahoga County 
venires, even though Cuyahoga County’s felon population may be even 
higher than overall state estimates, given it had “the highest share of 
returning prisoners in the state,” with just over one-fifth (22%) of all 
people released from prison in Ohio in 2001 being released to Cuyahoga 
County. 62 
For at least the last 20 years, by design, there was no chance a person 
with a felony conviction would appear in an eligible jury pool in 
55. Id. (“ Q. So it’s the practice to excuse those three without any judicial intervention? A.
Correct.”). 
56. Id. at 1136.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1136–37 (“ Q. And is it your practice that if a person has a felony conviction any time 
in their life, then they will not be eligible for jury duty? A. I believe that’s how the statute reads, yes. 
Q. That’s your interpretation? A. Yes.”). 
59. CLEVELAND MUNICIPAL COURT, Jury Services, https://clevelandmunicipalcourt.org/
judicial-services/administrative-services/jury-services [https://perma.cc/2SUK-TPGG] (“ In 2013, the 
Cleveland Municipal Court and the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court united their resources 
and created a new system in which we share jury services. Cleveland Municipal Court jurors are 
drawn from a pool of registered voters in Cleveland and the Village of Bratenahl supplied by the 
Cuyahoga County Board of Elections.”). 
60. I-Team Exclusive: Inside the Grand Jury, FOX 8, (Jul. 23, 2015, 6:26 PM),
https://fox8.com/news/i-team-exclusive-inside-the-grand-jury/ [https://perma.cc/5D47-U3LU] 
(“ Grand Jury members “ are drawn from the same pool of people chosen to serve on juries in court 
cases.”). 
61. Transcript of Trial at 1142, State v. Sowell, No. 2011-1921 (Cuyahoga Com. Pl., June 1,
2011). 
62. NANCY G. LA VIGNE, GILLIAN L. THOMSON, CHRISTY VISHER, VERA KACHNOWSKI &
JEREMY Travis, A PORTRAIT OF PRISONER REENTRY IN OHIO 60–80 (2003). 
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Cuyahoga County. 63 The exclusion of people with felony convictions was 
so systemic in Cuyahoga County that the Jury Commission established 
three separate processes to identify, verify, and then exclude people with 
felony convictions. First, the Jury Commission identified people with 
felonies using the Sherriff’s database as described by Ms. Kelly, and 
second, by using the court’s own database, the CJIS application, which 
allows the Jury Commission to check for convictions on the court’s 
docket. 64 Lastly, people with felony convictions were also removed if they 
called in to alert the officials of their prior conviction. 65 
Because of the systemic exclusion of people with felony convictions 
in Cuyahoga County juries over the last two decades—as well as the high 
percentage of African-American men in that excluded population—
venires in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas using this jury 
selection process reflected a significant underrepresentation of African-
American men. Further, such a disparity has been observed in these jury 
pools over a significant period of time. 66 
It remains to be seen how the 2020 changes will affect the 
representation of those with felony convictions or African-American men 
in Cuyahoga County jury pools, and to what extent individual judges and 
attorneys are aware of this change. 
B. Hamilton County’s jury selection process. 
The Hamilton County Courts provide the correct statement of the law 
on their website, explaining, “Jurors who have prior felony convictions 
are eligible to serve on jury duty provided that they are no longer 
63. Transcript of Trial at 1129, State v. Sowell, No. 2011-1921 (Cuyahoga Com. Pl., June 1,
2011). 
64. Id. at 1136.
65. Id. at 1127. In a rare case when a prospective juror with a felony conviction slipped into
the jury pool, the trial court still removed her after learning of her felony conviction, in contravention 
of Ohio Rev. Code § 2967.16. State v. Lee, 2017-Ohio-1449, ¶ 22 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017). The Court 
of Appeals found no prejudice since any argument that the prospective juror “ would have voted to 
acquit is speculative”—a seemingly impossible standard for any defendant to overcome. Id. ¶ 27 
(citing State v. Harrison, 2015-Ohio-1419, ¶ 27, 31 N.E.3d 220, 233 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015) (internal 
quotation omitted). As described in section IV, below, the constitutional implications of juror 
exclusion are clearer on a systemic level than in an individual instance. 
66. Transcript of Trial at 819–20, State v. Madison, No. 579539 (Cuyahoga Com. Pl, Apr. 28,
2014) (trial attorney noting that out of 300–400 jury trials in Cuyahoga Court of Common Pleas over 
several decades, “ I can probably think of maybe two or three . . . jury venires that I have had that 
actually reached that level [of proportionate representation of African-Americans on jury venires]. I 
have had a number of . . . jury venires in which there have been no minorities of any kind.”). 
12
Akron Law Review, Vol. 54 [2021], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol54/iss2/2
2020] EX-OFFENDERS AND JURY SERVICE  249 
incarcerated or on their period of probation/community control.”67 The 
Hamilton County Local Rules also state, less specifically, that persons are 
ineligible for jury service if they “[h]ave been convicted of a felony and 
have not had their civil rights restored.”68 
The Court’s juror information website permits a potential juror with 
a prior felony conviction to “opt out” of jury service. As the Court’s 
website explains, “[i]f you wish to be excused based on a past felony 
conviction the Jury Commission Office will consider your request.”69 No 
additional information could be found on the website about what the 
guidelines are for allowing a person with a felony conviction to “opt out” 
of jury service. Allowing a subset of otherwise qualified jurors to “opt 
out” could be constitutionally problematic, especially when “a flavor, a 
distinct quality is lost” by the absence of the excluded group. 70 
In addition, there are pressing questions as to whether courts or 
attorneys understand the appropriate standard for jury service. In a death 
penalty case before Judge Steven Martin in the Hamilton County Court of 
Common Pleas, for example, the trial court repeatedly removed 
prospective jurors for cause for having prior felony convictions, excusing 
a total of five potential jurors. 71 This included four jurors before voir dire, 
including one with a conviction from 17 years earlier. 72 The Court listed 
all four of these jurors in its two entries “Excusing Jurors for Cause.” In 
addition, during voir dire, the trial court removed a prospective juror for 
cause, even after he made clear that his conviction was a decade old and 
that he was not on post-release control. 73 
For each dismissal in that case, defense counsel not only failed to 
object or request to question the jurors, but repeatedly agreed that the 
prospective jurors should be removed for cause for having prior felony 
convictions. On March 22, 2010, for example, defense counsel agreed to 
67. HAMILTON CTY. CTS., Juror Excuses, https://hamiltoncountycourts.org/index.php/juror-
excuses/ [https://perma.cc/RY8X-66DZ] (further noting that any wish to be excused based on a past  
felony conviction will be considered by the Jury Commission Office). 
68. L.R. 8(IV)(A) of the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton County, General Division.
69. HAMILTON CTY. CTS., supra note 70.
70. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 532; see Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 369 (1979).
71. Transcript of Proceedings on Motions, at 250–51, State v. Pickens, No. B-0905088
(Hamilton Com. Pl., Mar. 22, 2010); Transcript of Proceedings on Pretrial Motions at 400, State v. 
Pickens, No. B-0905088 (Hamilton Com. Pl., Mar. 31, 2010). The author is lead counsel on the 
pending habeas corpus petition challenging this conviction in federal court. Pickens v. Shoop, No. 
1:19-cv-558, 2020 WL 3128536 (S.D. Ohio June 12, 2020). 
72. Transcript of Proceedings on Pretrial Motions at 400, State v. Pickens, No. B-0905088
(Hamilton Com. Pl., Mar. 31, 2010).  
73. Transcript of Trial at 652–53, State v. Pickens, No. B-0905088 (Hamilton Com. Pl., Apr.
12, 2010) (Court: “ What we’re going to do is excuse you from service because of your felony.”). 
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the removal of two prospective jurors with felony convictions before voir 
dire, stating that “they would be excused anyway so we would agree they 
should be excused.”74 
In another case, the Court of Appeals in Hamilton County has 
recognized that “a convicted felon may have the right to serve as a juror 
restored by obtaining a pardon or by the terms outlined in R.C. 
2967.16(C)(1),” and that the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas  
“erred in excluding the two potential jurors in this case solely because 
their convictions had not been pardoned, expunged, or reversed on 
appeal.”75 Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals found that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in excusing the jurors for cause “because the 
record fails to demonstrate that either juror had the right to serve as a juror 
restored pursuant to the terms of R.C. 2967.16(C)(1)[.]”76 
The Court of Appeals’ disinclination to look into the matter further 
does not inspire confidence in the court’s decision, particularly since 
potential jurors may have lacked any opportunity to discuss on the record 
their restoration of rights. 77 Accordingly, this is a concerning gap in the 
protection of the rights of those with felony convictions from court to 
court within the county. 
C. Franklin County’s jury selection process. 
On its website, the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas lists the 
incorrect standard for disqualification. According to the site, if you “have 
been convicted of a felony that has not been expunged,” then “that, by 
law, make[s] you ineligible for jury service in Franklin County.”78 As 
noted above, pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code § 2967.16(C)(1), there is no 
requirement that a felony be expunged before one can serve on a jury. 
Accordingly, the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is 
74. Transcript of Proceedings on Motions, at 250–51, State v. Pickens, No. B-0905088
(Hamilton Com. Pl., Mar. 22, 2010). 
75. Dawson, 2015-Ohio-488, ¶ 23.
76. Id. (citing State v. Stone, 2014-Ohio-4444, ¶ 36 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014) (holding that “we 
cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing Prospective Juror No. 3 for cause” 
where “ nothing in the record indicated that his rights had been restored” after a prior conviction)). 
77. See, e.g., State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St. 3d 378, 393, 721 N.E.2d 52, 67 (Ohio 2000) (“ The 
better practice in this case would have been to question the juror, on the record, to determine the status 
of his previous conviction.”). In that case, however, the court determined that the juror would have 
been excused anyway, since the same prosecutor and police officer from the case had been involved 
in his prior conviction. Id. 
78. FRANKLIN CTY. CT. COM. PL., Requests For Disqualification, https://www.fccourts.org/
248/Requests-for-Disqualification [https://perma.cc/V6MG-PVDC]. 
14
Akron Law Review, Vol. 54 [2021], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol54/iss2/2
2020] EX-OFFENDERS AND JURY SERVICE  251 
misinforming potential jurors about the standards for disqualification 
from jury service under state law. 
The Local Rules preclude individuals from jury eligibility who 
“[h]ave been convicted of a felony and have not had their civil rights 
restored.”79 According to the Rules, Ohio Rev. Code § 2961.01 
“[p]recludes convicted felons from serving as jurors.”80 While the first 
formulation is technically correct, the second formulation clearly is not. 
Rather, Ohio Rev. Code § 2967.16(C)(1) restores the privilege of serving 
as a juror on a petit jury to a person who was convicted of a felony who 
has completed his probation or a period of one or more community control 
sanctions. Even in the first formulation, the Local Rules include no 
definition of “restored” or any reference to Ohio Rev. Code 
§ 2967.16(C)(1). The only reference to “restore[d]” rights in Ohio Rev.
Code § 2961.01, the statute cited in the Local Rule, is when someone 
receives a full pardon. 81 There is nothing in the Local Rules informing 
judges, attorneys, or potential jurors that those with felony convictions 
may have their right to juror eligibility restored outside of the pardon 
process. 
Accordingly, the Local Rules, combined with the information 
available on the court’s website, serve to erroneously inform the public 
that persons with a felony conviction are precluded from jury service 
unless the conviction is expunged or pardoned. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE IMPROPER EXCLUSION OF
JURY-ELIGIBLE PERSONS WITH A FELONY CONVICTION 
Trial by jury presupposes a jury drawn from a pool broadly 
representative of the community as well as impartial in a specific 
case. . . . [T]he broad representative character of the jury should be 
maintained, partly as assurance of a diffused impartiality and partly 
because sharing in the administration of justice is a phase of civic 
79. Loc.R. 27.07 of the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, General Division (citing
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2961.01 (West 2020). 
80. Id. The Montgomery Court of Common Pleas lists as ineligible those who “ [h]ave been
convicted of a felony, have not completed their jail time, probation, or community sanction, and have 
not had their civil rights restored.” Loc.R. 1.23(D)(3) of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery 
County. While this is a less problematic framing than the Franklin County Local Rules, it is still 
potentially confusing. As § 2967.16 automatically restores ones’ rights at the end of community 
control or parole, it is not clear why the rule lists “ have not had their civil right restored” as a separate 
requirement. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2967.16 (West 2020). The Montgomery County Court of 
Common Pleas website appears to provide no clarifying discussion of the matter. See MONTGOMERY 
CTY. CT. COM. PL., Jury FAQ, https://montcourt.oh.gov/jurors/#jury-faq [https://perma.cc/X3JC-
D47C]. 
81. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2967.16(C)(1) (West 2020).
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responsibility.82  
Even apart from violating state law, the underrepresentation of a 
cognizable group in a petit jury venire can constitute a denial of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 the Fair Cross Section 
requirement of the Sixth Amendment, 84 and the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 85 The principles establishing a Sixth 
Amendment fair cross section claim are the same for showing lack of a 
fair cross section in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause. 86 Accordingly, constitutional challenges relating to 
underrepresentation in a jury venire generally arise as either (1) a fair 
cross section claim under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments or (2) an 
equal protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
A. Fair Cross Section under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments 
The presence of a fair cross section of the community on venires, 
panels, or lists from which petit juries are drawn is essential to the 
fulfillment of both the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process 
and the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of an impartial jury trial in criminal 
prosecutions. 87 This Sixth Amendment guarantee—made binding on the 
States through the Fourteenth Amendment—ensures not that the 
particular jury hearing the case reflect a fair cross section of the 
community, but rather that “the jury wheels, pools of names, panels or 
venires from which juries are drawn [do] not systematically exclude 
distinctive groups in the community and thereby fail to be reasonably 
representative thereof.”88 Similarly, a state cannot “subject a defendant to 
indictment or trial by a jury that has been selected in an arbitrary and 
discriminatory manner, in violation of the Constitution and laws of the 
United States.”89 Accordingly, “a criminal defendant has standing to 
challenge the system used to select his grand or petit jury, on the ground 
that it arbitrarily excludes from service the members of any race, and 
82. Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
83. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 501–03 (1972).
84. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 531.
85. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977).
86. Peters, 407 U.S. at 495–96; see Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 358–359 (1979); Taylor,
419 U.S. at 528; see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (making applicable to the 
states the Sixth Amendment right to a petit jury through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
87. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 526, 530; Peters, 407 U.S. at 501–03.
88. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 526, 538 (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)).
89. Peters, 407 U.S. at 502–03.
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thereby denies him due process of law.”90 In other words, under both the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, a fair cross section claim is concerned 
with whether steps in the jury selection process that precede the selection 
of petit jurors fail to include representative numbers of groups in the 
community. 
A fair cross section claim is generally not waived by failure to raise 
it at trial. Counsel are not expected to be on notice of systematic jury 
composition issues from the composition of a single jury, particularly 
when there is an underrepresentation of a relatively small group. 91 Each 
jury pool will vary even without systematic exclusion, and thus “[a] gaze 
into the jury gallery tells you nothing and, in fact, can be misleading.”92 
Further, to “suggest that an effective defense attorney must investigate the 
jury assembly process in every case conditioned upon his client’s loss of 
the right is unnecessary and wasteful.”93 In Garcia-Dorantes, for 
example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed a grant 
of habeas corpus where the attorney learned about the facts underlying the 
claim after trial. 94 Specifically, the attorney read in a news article about a 
computer glitch that had caused racial disparities in the jury venire. 95 In 
that case, the Sixth Circuit found that the facts underlying the claim were 
not “reasonably available” to counsel at the time of the trial. 96 
Under Duren, a criminal defendant alleging a fair cross section 
violation under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments must satisfy a 
three-prong prima facie test by showing the following: 
(1) [T]he group alleged to be excluded [from the jury system] is a 
“distinctive” group in the community; (2) that the representation of this 
group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable 
in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that 
90. Id. at 504–05 (evaluating a claim that African-Americans were systematically excluded
from jury service, and citing 18 U.S.C. § 243 (prohibiting exclusion of jurors “ on account of race or 
color”)). 
91. See Ambrose v. Booker, 684 F.3d 638, 645–47 (6th Cir. 2012).
92. Id. at 646 (quoting Ambrose v. Booker, No. 06-13361-BC, 2011 WL 1806426, at *2 (E.D.
Mich.)). 
93. Id.
94. Garcia-Dorantes, 801 F.3d at 598 n.9 (6th Cir. 2015).
95. Id. at 590.
96. Id. at 598 n.9 (“ Because the factual basis for Garcia-Dorantes’ claim—the computer
glitch—was not reasonably available to counsel, and Garcia-Dorantes could not have known that 
minorities were underrepresented in the jury pool by looking at the venire panel, Garcia-Dorantes has 
shown cause.”); see also Ege v. Yukins, 485 F.3d 364, 372 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that where defense 
counsel did not get actual notice of a letter until four years after it was written, the court would 
consider the date defense counsel learned of the letter as the first date they were actually aware of it); 
Ambrose, 684 F.3d at 645. 
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this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in 
the jury-selection process.97 
If a defendant establishes these three prongs, he has established a prima 
facie violation of the fair cross section requirement. 98 The burden shifts 
then to the government to show “attainment of a fair cross section to be 
incompatible with a significant state interest.”99 This standard was 
unanimously reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in the 2010 case of 
Berghuis v. Smith. 100 Unlike an equal protection violation, a fair cross 
section violation does not require any showing of intent or improper 
motive. 101 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit explained 
“[w]hile the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
prohibits underrepresentation of minorities in juries by reason of 
intentional discrimination, ‘[t]he sixth amendment is stricter because it 
forbids any substantial underrepresentation of minorities, regardless 
of . . . motive.’”102 Thus, even accidental errors can establish a fair cross 
section violation. 
1. People who have been convicted of felonies and African-
American men are distinct groups in the community.
The first prong of a fair cross section violation is that the excluded 
jurors are of a distinct group. 103 For the purposes of this article, two 
distinct groups excluded from the juries are: (1) those with felony 
convictions who were eligible to serve because their civil rights had been 
restored and, more broadly, (2) African-American men. Several circuits 
have adopted a three-prong test for determining whether a group is  
distinctive: 
(1) [T]hat the group is defined and limited by some factor (i.e., that the 
group has a definite composition such as race or sex); (2) that a common 
thread or basic similarity in attitude, ideas, or experience runs through 
97. Duren, 439 U.S. at 364.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 367–68.
100.  Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314 (2010). 
101.  See United States v. Gelb, 881 F.2d 1155, 1161 (2d Cir. 1989). 
102.  Id. (alterations in original) (internal citation omitted); see also Nina W. Chernoff, Wrong 
About the Right: How Courts Undermine the Fair Cross-Section Guarantee by Confusing It With 
Equal Protection, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 141, 141 (2012) (“ Under the Sixth Amendment . . . a defendant 
can establish a prima facie violation by showing that the underrepresentation of a distinctive group in 
the jury pool is inherent in the selection process, whether by accident or design. The equal protection 
clause, in contrast, demands evidence of discriminatory intent.”). 
103.  See Duren, 439 U.S. at 364. 
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the group; and (3) that there is a community of interest among members 
of the group such that the group’s interests cannot be adequately 
represented if the group is excluded from the jury selection process. 104 
Both sex and race are well-established, distinct groups. 105 Thus, African-
American men are clearly a distinct group for this analysis. 106 In addition, 
African-Americans as a group have a long history of underrepresentation 
on juries. A study of Lucas County, Ohio, for example, found that “blacks 
and Hispanics are underrepresented in a statistically significant degree 
beginning with the source list” of potential jurors. 107 After the source list, 
“the various jury lists revealed big increases in black and Hispanic 
underrepresentativeness.”108 The effects of felony exclusion only 
exacerbate this historic underrepresentation. 109 As a result of “the 
disproportionately high rate of felony convictions among African 
Americans and the policies that disenfranchise those with convictions, 
Black people continue to be regularly underrepresented in jury pools.”110 
This disparity has a profound effect on the justice system where 
studies have shown that “the greater the percentage of Whites on a jury, 
the more likely it was to convict a Black defendant” regardless of the type 
of crime or the strength of the prosecution’s case.111 There is a large racial 
disparity in support for the death penalty, for example, with whites being 
 104.  Ford v. Seabold, 841 F.2d 677, 681–82 (6th Cir. 1988) (citing Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 
982 (1st Cir. 1985) (en banc); Willis v. Zant, 720 F.2d 1212 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 
1256 (1984). 
105.  See, e.g., Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 549–51 (1967); Taylor, 419 U.S. at 532. 
 106.  See also Kutz, supra note 18, at 2110–11 (“ Virginia’s restoration of rights process, 
although neutral on its face, disparately impacts the African American community and may deprive 
an accused African American of his right to be tried by a jury of his peers in a criminal trial.”). 
107.  Ronald Randall, James A. Wood & Robert G. Martin, Racial Representativeness of Juries: 
An Analysis of Source List and Administrative Effects on the Jury Pool, 29 JUST. SYS. J. 71, 81 (2008). 
108.  Id. at 82. 
 109.  See Anna Roberts, Casual Ostracism: Jury Exclusion on the Basis of Criminal Convictions, 
98 MINN. L. REV. 592, 602–05 (2013) (“ The exclusion of those with criminal records brings the risk 
of exacerbating racial disparity within the jury system.”). 
110.  Alexis Hoag, An Unbroken Thread: African American Exclusion from Jury Service, Past 
and Present, 81 LA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 20), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3636336, [https://perma.cc/LF2H-A4W5] (citing MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM 
CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS, 97–114 (2012); EQUAL JUSTICE  
INITIATIVE, ILLEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION: A CONTINUING LEGACY 14–16 
(2010), https://eji.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/10/illegal-racial-discrimination-in-jury-selection.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2N7T-3AEF]. 
 111.  Samuel R. Sommers & Satia A. Marotta, Racial Disparities in Legal Outcomes: On 
Policing, Charging Decisions, and Criminal Trial Proceedings, 1 POL’Y INSIGHTS FROM BEHAV. & 
BRAIN SCI. 103, 106–09 (2014) (collecting studies). 
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significantly more likely to support the death penalty than blacks.112 
Accordingly, “the systematic exclusion of one race and its unique set of 
experiences from the jury process raises serious concerns.”113 Even 
outside of the effect on verdicts themselves, there is a significant impact 
of jury demographics on the perceived legitimacy of the judicial 
system. 114 
People who have a felony conviction constitute a distinct group 
under this definition as well. 115 Being convicted of a felony defines and 
limits the group of people under consideration. In other words, there is a 
clear line of demarcation between those who are “felons” and those who 
are not. The experiences of those with felony convictions are unlike those 
of other potential jurors. They have firsthand experience with the criminal 
justice system and understand the implications and collateral 
consequences of convicting someone. Other segments of society lack this 
extremely relevant viewpoint, and when people who have been convicted 
of a felony are categorically excluded as a class, their perspective is  
completely lost from the jury. 
 112.  See Joseph Carroll, Who Supports the Death Penalty?, GALLUP (Nov. 16, 2004), 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/14050/who-supports-death-penalty.aspx [https://perma.cc/485P-9BAE] 
(“ The data show that 71% of whites support the death penalty, compared with only 44% of blacks.”); 
Theodore Eisenberg, Stephen P. Garvey & Martin T. Wells, Forecasting Life and Death: Juror Race, 
Religion and Attitude Toward the Death Penalty, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 277, 286 (2001) (“ Nearly two-
thirds of white jurors vote for death on the first vote, compared to about one third of black jurors.”);  
William J. Bowers, Benjamin D. Steiner & Marla Sandys, Death Sentencing in Black and White: An 
Empirical Analysis of the Role of Jurors’ Race and Jury Racial Composition, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
171, 192–93 (2001) (There is a clear “ white male dominance” effect in capital sentencing in cases 
with black defendants and white victims. “ The presence of five or more white males on the jury 
dramatically increased the likelihood of a death sentence . . . . The presence of black male jurors in 
[the same cases], by contrast, substantially reduced the likelihood of a death sentence.”). 
 113.  Edward S. Adams & Christian J. Lane, Constructing a Jury that is Both Impartial and 
Representative: Utilizing Cumulative Voting in Jury Selection, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 703, 710 (1998). 
The authors found difficultly measuring how demographics affect verdict outcomes, but concluded,  
“ Since persons of different races often process the same information in different ways, often to 
different conclusions, the exclusion of any race or other group results in a sort of unconstitutional 
partiality.” Id. (citing Burt Neuborne, Of Sausage Factories and Syllogism Machines: Formalism, 
Realism, and Exclusionary Selection Techniques, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 419, 443 (1992) (“ The 
systematic exclusion of a particular point of view from the jury box through the exclusion of minority 
jurors implicates the very reality that jurors are called upon to certify.”)). 
 114.  Adams, supra note 112, at 710 (“ What becomes apparent in evaluating juries is the impact 
of jury demographics on the public’s acceptance of verdicts and the public’s perception of justice.”). 
 115.  See Paula Z. Segal, A More Inclusive Democracy: Challenging Felon Jury Exclusion in 
New York, 13 N.Y.C. L. REV. 313, 348 (2010) (“ The Duren concept of a cognizable or distinct group 
encompasses those with conviction histories . . . . At least one federal circuit court has already 
conceded that individuals’ contact with the criminal justice system is sufficient to make them a 
distinctive group for cross-section purposes.”) (citing United States v. Greene, 995 F.2d 793, 797 (8th 
Cir. 1993)). 
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“People with felony records are set apart not only by the stigma and 
collateral consequences that come with a criminal conviction but also by 
the extreme concentration by sex, race, and socioeconomic status.”116 
“[I]ncarceration has become a routine life event for low-skilled black 
men—more common than serving in the military or earning a college 
degree.”117 
Thus, both categories of potential jurors—African-American men 
and people with felony convictions—are distinct groups under the first 
prong of Duren. 
2. Whether the number of those with felony convictions and
African-American men on the juries was fair and reasonable in
relation to their number in the community.
The second prong of a fair cross-section violation is that the distinct 
group is unfairly or unreasonably underrepresented. 118 Those with felony 
convictions make up at least 5 to 9.9% of the population in Ohio, and 
counties with population centers likely have a higher percentage of those 
with felony convictions than the state overall. 119 Accordingly, when those 
with felony convictions are systematically removed, such exclusion from 
a jury is unfair and unreasonable underrepresentation. 120 
The prison and community control populations are overwhelmingly 
male and disproportionately African-American. 121 People with felony 
convictions account for an estimated 8% of all adults in the United States, 
but constitute 33% of the African-American adult male population. 122 By 
2010, between 15% and 19.9% of black adults in Ohio had a felony 
record. 123 
Even when African-American men are not completely excluded from 
a jury venire, they can be underrepresented as a result of excluding those 
with felony convictions. There are a variety of ways to analyze the relative 
representation of a group, most frequently through measuring absolute 
and comparative disparity. 124 Absolute disparity “measures the difference 
between the percentage of a group in the general population and its 
 116.  Shannon et al., supra note 31, at 1797. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW 
JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2012). 
117.  Shannon et al., supra note 31, at 1797 (internal citations and emphasis omitted). 
118.  See Duren, 439 U.S. at 364. 
119.  Shannon et al., supra note 31, at 1810. 
120.  See Taylor, 419 U.S. at 532. 
121.  Shannon, supra note 31, at 1797. 
122.  Id. 
123.  Id. at 1810. 
124.  See Garcia-Dorantes, 801 F.3d at 600–04. 
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percentage in the qualified wheel.”125 To find the absolute disparity, 
subtract the percentage in the venire from the percentage in the general 
population. As an example, “if Asians constitute 10% of the general 
population and 5% of the qualified wheel, the absolute disparity is 5%.”126 
In contrast, the comparative disparity “measures the decreased likelihood 
that members of an underrepresented group will be called for jury 
service.” To find the comparative disparity, divide the absolute disparity 
by the percentage in the population. So, in the above example the 
comparative disparity is 50%. Although courts look at both absolute and 
comparative disparities, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
has made clear that the comparative test is more accurate for evaluating 
disparities in smaller populations. 127 
Analyzing absolute and comparative disparities for representations 
in jury venires will reveal whether a particular venire was “not fair and 
reasonable in relation to the number of [African-American men] in the 
community.”128 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has found 
that an absolute disparity of 3.45% and comparative disparity of 42% for 
African-Americans, and a 1.66% absolute disparity and 27.64% 
comparative disparity for Hispanics, was sufficient to establish this 
prong. 129 The Sixth Circuit has also found that a 1.28% absolute disparity 
and 34% comparative disparity was sufficient. 130 
In Hamilton County, for example, a statistician recently affirmed that 
in the 16 capital trials and grand juries summoned between 1987 and 2016, 
African-Americans were underrepresented with an absolute disparity of 
7.96% and a comparative disparity of 33.86% using the U.S. Census 
Bureau’s 2006–2010 American Community Survey. 131 In other words, “a 
third of the African Americans expected to be summoned are missing.”132 
 125.  Id. at 600–01; see also Ramseur v. Beyer, 983 F.2d 1215, 1231 (3d Cir. 1992) (“ Absolute 
disparity in the jury selection context is defined as the difference between the percentage of a certain  
population group eligible for jury duty and the percentage of that group who actually appear in the 
venire.”). 
126.  Garcia-Dorantes, 801 F.3d at 601. 
 127.  See id.; see also United States v. Hernandez-Estrada, 749 F.3d 1154, 1160–64 (9th Cir. 
2014) (explaining in detail the problems with exclusively relying on the absolute disparity). 
128.  Duren, 439 U.S. at 364. 
129.  See Garcia-Dorantes, 801 F.3d at 603. 
130.  See Smith v. Berghuis, 543 F.3d 326, 338 (6th Cir. 2008), rev’d on other grounds, 559 U.S. 
314 (2010); see also Garcia-Dorantes, 801 F.3d at 602 n.12 (explaining why the holding on prong 
two in Smith v. Berghuis remains binding precedent despite the Supreme Court reversal); Ambrose,  
684 F.3d at 643 (finding a 3.45% absolute disparity and 42% comparative disparity sufficient). 
 131.  Declaration of Jeffrey O’Neal Martin at ¶ 22, 28, Pickens v. Shoop, No. 1:19-cv-558 (S.D. 
Ohio June 11, 2020). 
132.  Id. at ¶ 28. 
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In the 24 capital trials seated between 1985 and 2016 in Hamilton County, 
African-Americans were underrepresented with an absolute disparity of 
10.88% and a comparative disparity of 46.28% using the U.S. Census 
Bureau’s 2006-2010 American Community Survey. 133 In other words, 
“almost half of the African-Americans expected to be serving on capital 
trials are missing.”134 
Where those with felony convictions are completely excluded from 
the jury venire, and African-American men were unfairly and 
unreasonably underrepresented in the jury venire, the second prong of 
Duren is satisfied. 
3. Whether the exclusion of those with felony convictions and
underrepresentation of African-American men was systematic.
The final question for determining whether there is a prima facie case 
of a Sixth Amendment violation is whether the underrepresentation was 
systematic. 135 “Systematic” means that the exclusion or 
underrepresentation was “due to the system by which juries were 
selected.”136 
In Cuyahoga County, for example, court personnel testified that it 
was their regular practice to exclude everyone with a felony conviction, 
and that procedures were in place to ensure individuals with a felony 
conviction at any time in their lives were not included on eligible jury lists  
for at least the last 22 years. 137 The exclusion of those with felony 
convictions was so systematic in Cuyahoga County that there were three 
separate processes to identify, verify, and then exclude individuals with a 
felony conviction at any time in their lives. 138 First, the Jury Commission 
identified people with felonies using the Sherriff’s database, second, using 
the Court’s own CJIS database, and third, relying on those that called in 
and alerted the officials to their felon status. 139 Despite a 2006 Attorney 
General advisory opinion confirming that many of those with felony 
convictions should not be excluded from Ohio juries, the Cuyahoga 
County courts apparently continued to do so until early 2020. 140 
133.  Id. at ¶ 23, 29. 
134.  Id. at ¶ 29. 
135.  See Duren, 439 U.S. at 366. 
136.  Id. at 367. 
137.  Transcript of Trial at 1102–38, State v. Sowell, No. 2011-1921 (Cuyahoga Com. Pl., June 
1, 2011). 
138.  Id. 
139.  Id. 
140.  Ohio AG Opinion, supra note 12. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
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Similarly, Franklin County continues to this day to misinform 
potential jurors that if they “have been convicted of a felony that has not 
been expunged,” they are “by law. . . ineligible for jury service in Franklin 
County.”141 In addition, as outlined above, the Hamilton County Court of 
Common Pleas has repeatedly failed to uphold the rights of those with 
felony convictions to serve on juries. 142 Using a standard deviation 
analysis, a statistician recently found that the underrepresentation of 
African-American jurors summoned or serving on capital trials in 
Hamilton County is “statistically significant” and “not the result of 
random factors, chance, or luck, but is the result of a systematic process 
that underrepresents African Americans” over the course of decades.143 
As a result, the number of “actual capital trials without African American 
trial jurors analyzed exceeded the expected number of trials without 
African American trial jurors by 4 to 8 times.”144 Because African-
American men are disproportionately convicted of felonies, 145 a 
systematic exclusion of those with felony convictions is at least one cause 
of the underrepresentation of African-American men in jury pools. A 
systematic exclusion of those with felony convictions causes systemic 
underrepresentation of African-American men, which would satisfy a 
prima facie case of a violation of the fair cross section requirement of the 
Sixth Amendment. 
B. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection. 
The very idea of a jury is a body of men composed of the peers or equals 
of the person whose rights it is selected or summoned to determine; that 
is, of his neighbors, fellows, associates, persons having the same legal 
status in society as that which he holds.146 
To establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, a defendant must prove that: (1) the group 
alleged to have been wrongly excluded is a distinct group in the 
community; (2) the degree of underrepresentation is disproportionate to 
the number of the group in the community; and (3) the selection procedure 
 141.  FRANKLIN CTY. CT. COM. PL., Requests for Disqualification, https://www.fccourts.org/
248/Requests-for-Disqualification [https://perma.cc/EW9M-VXXU]. 
142.  See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 143.  Declaration of Jeffrey O’Neal Martin at ¶ 34, Pickens v. Shoop, No. 1:19-cv-558 (S.D. 
Ohio June 11, 2020). 
144.  Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 178, Pickens v. Shoop, No. 1:19-cv-558 (S.D. Ohio 
June 11, 2020). 
145.  Shannon, supra note 31, at 1810. 
146.  Strauder v. W. Va., 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879). 
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is subject to abuse. 147 Therefore, unlike a due process challenge, a 
defendant may establish a prima facie case without explicitly proving that 
the discrimination was caused by systematic exclusion.148 
For an equal protection claim, the only consideration in addition to 
those in the previous section is whether a defendant can establish a prima 
facie case of intentional discrimination in the selection process.149 Such a 
claim is satisfied if county officials were aware of the issue and neglected 
to take action to remedy the discriminatory felon exclusion practice. In 
2006, the Ohio Attorney General was asked by a county prosecutor’s 
office to provide an advisory opinion on the issue of felon juror 
eligibility. 150 In the July 24, 2006, opinion, the Ohio Attorney General 
clearly explained that a person convicted of a felony may serve as a juror 
after completing probation or community control sanctions.151 As a result 
of this opinion, as well as judicial opinions discussing the relevant law,152 
court officials should have actual and constructive knowledge of what 
Ohio law requires. Indeed, it is the job of a court to know and apply the 
correct law from the time it becomes effective. Alternatively,  
discriminatory intent exists where the substantial underrepresentation has 
persisted over a significant period of time, such as the more than 20 years 
of exclusion in Cuyahoga County. 153 
As noted above, there is no compelling, or even rational, 
governmental reason for treating jury eligibility for those with felony 
convictions differently from county to county, in violation of state law.154 
Pointing out the constitutional implications of improper jury exclusion 
should not be necessary to remedy the situation, given that the Ohio 
General Assembly already bestowed jury eligibility to those with felony 
convictions who completed any parole or community control sanctions 
that may have been imposed. However, constitutional violations may be 
necessary for a federal action or habeas relief, for example, should the 
state courts fail to offer relief for their own violations. 155 
147.  Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 494; see Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 565 (1979). 
148.  See Duren, 439 U.S. at 370–371 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
149.  See Gelb, 881 F.2d at 1161.  
150.  Ohio AG Opinion, supra note 12. 
151.  Id. 
152.  See, e.g., Dawson, 2015-Ohio-488, ¶¶ 21–23. 
153.  Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 495. 
154.  See Garcia-Dorantes, 801 F.3d at 604 (6th Cir. 2015) (“ [B]ecause the glitch was 
inadvertent, no state interest was advanced by the computer error and subsequent underrepresentati on 
of minorities in the jury venire.”). 
 155.  A federal court may entertain a habeas corpus petition filed by a person in state custody 
“ only on the ground that he is custody in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 
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V. STRATEGIES TO IMPROVE JUROR UNDERREPRESENTATION. 
A. Courts and court officers. 
If court personnel, judges, and jury commissioners are confused by 
the current state of the law, then there is little chance they will correctly 
inform the public or implement the law at trial. 156 The Supreme Court of 
Ohio Judicial College “[p]rovide[s] a comprehensive program of 
continuing education for the judges, acting judges, magistrates, and court 
personnel of the state . . . . 157 As part of this education for both judicial 
officers and court personnel, the Judicial College should make clear in its 
curriculum that a person who has been convicted of a felony is eligible for 
jury service upon the completion of any parole or community control 
sanctions that may have been imposed. The Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court of Ohio could also create a task force to study the issues across all 
counties and help bring local courts into compliance with state law on jury 
selection. 158 
In addition, a division of the Supreme Court of Ohio—such as the 
Office of Court Services—could send a letter or hold a roundtable to make 
clear to trial and appellate courts the standards for juror eligibility. 159 In 
turn, the local courts should update their websites and other sources of 
information—including the summons language—to accurately reflect the 
law and include an overview of juror eligibility as part of the training or 
education of their own judicial officers and relevant court staff. 
 156.  Under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2313, jury commissioners are tasked with, among other 
responsibilities, compiling the jury source list annually, conducting a drawing of jurors, and—along 
with the courts of common pleas—deciding whether a juror may be excused from service. OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. §§ 2313.06, 09, 13–14. Commissioners may also “ examine under oath any juror called 
for trial as to that person’s qualifications to serve as a juror[,]” id. § 2313.01(B), including whether 
“ the person has been convicted of a crime that by law renders the person disqualified to serve on a 
jury,” id. § 2313.17(B)(1). 
157.  Ohio Gov. Jud. R. V(1)(B)(2). 
 158.  See Advisory Committees and Task Forces, OHIO SUP. CT., 
https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Boards/committees/ [https://perma.cc/9DKD-2SXN] 
(“ Advisory committees provide advice and assistance to the Court and Court staff on topics of general 
public interest or emerging issues significant to the law, the legal profession, and the judicial process. 
Task forces are formed to review specific issues or topics involving the law, courts, the legal  
profession, or the administration of justice. . . . Advisory committees and task forces are created by 
the Chief Justice with notice to the Court and operate at the discretion of the Chief Justice. Members  
of advisory committees and task forces are appointed by or with approval of the Chief Justice. [T]hey 
are comprised of judges, attorneys, clerks of court, other court personnel, and private citizens from 
throughout Ohio.”). 
159.  Office of Court Services, OHIO SUP. CT., http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/JCS/
courtSvcs/default.asp [https://perma.cc/VBF8-4XGZ]. 
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Since those with felony convictions who appear on jury source lists 
are often those who have completed incarceration and re-registered to 
vote, courts should start from the presumption that those with felony 
convictions who are summoned are eligible to serve. 160 Thus, courts 
should assume eligibility unless the person responds that they are still on 
parole or under community control sanction—as provided for in the new 
summons language on the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas  
website—or upon questioning at voir dire. 
If such channels are incapable of resolving the confusion, formal 
legal action may be required, particularly in light of the constitutional 
concerns outlined above. While attorneys can seek redress for defendants 
where a court improperly excluded eligible jurors, 161 systemic change 
may be better accomplished outside of the confines of a particular trial. 
Another possibility is a civil action to ensure that the courts take steps to 
provide correct information to those with felony convictions and enforce 
the proper standards for juror eligibility. A 2004 lawsuit, for example,  
sought to enjoin local boards of elections 
from advising ex-offenders that they are ineligible to vote while on 
probation, parole, or post release control, and requiring Defendant 
Secretary of State to issue notice to all felon ex-offenders in the state 
who have been released from prison during the past five years, advising 
them that they are eligible to vote if not incarcerated.162 
The suit settled when the boards of elections agreed “to take steps to 
ensure that correct information is provided to felons about their right to 
vote.”163 Similar action may be required to protect the right to serve on a 
jury for those eligible under state law. 
 160.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2313.06 (West 2020) (“ Annual compilation of jury source list”) 
(directing compilations of lists from the board of elections from each county as well as the registrar 
of motor vehicles). 
 161.  See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 114, Pickens v. Shoop, No. 1:19-cv-558 
(S.D. Ohio June 11, 2020) (“ The trial court deprived Pickens of his rights to an impartial jury, a fair 
trial, due process, equal protection, and the right to be free of excessive punishment under the Fifth, 
Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the constitution when it removed prospective jurors 
with felony convictions.”). 
 162.  Class Action Complaint, C.U.R.E. Ohio v. Kenneth Blackwell, No. 1:04CV543, 2004 WL 
3708731, at *2 (Aug. 17, 2004, S.D. Ohio). 
 163.  The Disenfranchisement of the Re-Enfranchised: Four Years Later, OHIO JUST. & POL’Y 
CTR., at 3 (Sept. 2008). The report also cited a separate suit against the Summit County Board of 
Elections. The Board had sent those with felony convictions letters informing them of the revocation 
of their right to vote, but not that it was reinstated upon release from incarceration. The District Court 
for the Northern District of Ohio required the Board “ to send correction letters to over 1,900 people 
who had been potentially misled by the earlier letter.” Id.; see Temporary Restraining Order, Racial  
Fairness Project v. Summit Cty. Bd. Elections, No. 5:04-CV-1948 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 28, 2004). If 
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B. Persons with felony convictions. 
The Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC) 
requires that each institutional library and Adult Parole Authority (APA) 
Regional Office contains “mandatory information for offender access” on 
subjects such as voting rights and “[o]ther verified ‘service’ information 
pertaining to reentry preparation.”164 In contrast, there is no requirement 
in the ODRC rules to provide information to released prisoners on their  
right to serve on a jury at the conclusion of any imposed parole or 
community control sanctions. 
The ODRC should provide every released prisoner, either at the time 
the prisoner is released from incarceration or at the time he or she is 
released from any imposed parole or community control sanctions, with 
written notice that his or her right to serve on a jury is restored. It would 
be appropriate to convey this information at the same time as any 
information about restoration of voting rights or how to register to vote, 
since jury source lists are compiled from electors in the county.165 The 
institutions could also place signs throughout prison facilities advising 
prisoners, in everyday language, that their jury eligibility is restored at the 
conclusion of any parole or community control sanctions. Since the 
ODRC and APA are already providing the aforementioned information 
pertaining to reentry preparation, there should be low implementation 
costs to including information related to jury eligibility as well. 
Similarly, APA officers could be required, as part of a final 
supervision meeting, to verbally inform ex-offenders at the close of their 
community supervision that they are now eligible for jury service and the 
importance of that civic responsibility. There is little rationale not to do 
so, as the implementation costs here should be similarly low if they exist 
at all. In addition, the Correctional Institution Inspection Committee 
(CIIC)— a bipartisan legislative committee tasked to “evaluate and assist 
the development of programs to improve the condition or operation of 
potentially misleading mailings have similarly dissuaded eligible jurors from responding 
affirmatively to a summons, similar remedial action may be required.  
164.  Reentry Resource Center, OHIO DEP’T. REHAB. & CORR., No. 78-REL-05 (Dec. 1, 2012). 
 165.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2313.06 (West 2020). While ODRC provides information about 
voter registration, neither it nor the APA appear to provide voter registration forms as part of release.  
As ODRC provides forms for obtaining a social security card, birth certificate, and driver’s license,  
it could provide the voter registration form as well, since—unlike for juror eligibility—there is no 
requirement that an ex-offender finish parole or community control sanctions before his or her right 
to vote is restored. See Inmate Transitional Release Planning, OHIO DEP’T. OF REHAB. & CORR., No. 
78-REL-01 (Feb. 25, 2019); see also The Disenfranchisement of the Re-Enfranchised, PRISON 
REFORM ADVOCACY CTR. (Aug. 2004); The Disenfranchisement of the Re-Enfranchised: Four Years 
Later, supra note 168. 
28
Akron Law Review, Vol. 54 [2021], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol54/iss2/2
2020] EX-OFFENDERS AND JURY SERVICE  265 
correctional institutions”166—could ensure implementation of the ODRC 
recommendations mentioned above, including written notice to released 
offenders that they are eligible to serve on a jury upon the completion of 
any imposed parole or community control sanctions.167 
C. Attorney education on jury eligibility. 
Active attorneys in the State of Ohio must complete 24 hours of 
accredited continuing legal education (CLE) activities every two years.168 
In addition, attorneys newly admitted to practice in Ohio are required to 
complete a minimum of 12 credit hours of New Lawyers Training 
instruction. 169 CLE requirements include at least 2.5 credit hours of 
instruction on professional conduct topics such as “[a]ccess to justice and 
fairness in the courts and how these issues impact public trust and 
confidence in the judicial system and the perception of justice in Ohio,” 
including “[a]ssuring fairness in matters of race, ethnicity, foreign origin, 
religion, gender, sexual orientation, disability, socio-economic status, or 
other relevant topics.”170 
As attorneys serve as active participants in any voir dire where a 
court is considering juror eligibility for those with felony convictions, it 
is imperative that they are properly trained to know and keep the court 
informed of the proper law in Ohio. Unfortunately attorneys have not 
consistently lived up to this role—for instance, in the Hamilton County 
case referenced above where both defense and prosecution counsel 
repeatedly agreed that the prospective jurors should be removed for cause 
for having prior felony convictions. 171 
Accordingly, it is imperative that Ohio CLE trainings focused on trial 
practice, particularly on voir dire, accurately address juror qualifications  
for those with felony convictions so that attorneys can correct any 
misunderstanding at trial and properly select a more representative jury. 
In addition, the topic of juror eligibility for those with felony convictions 
would also be appropriate for professional conduct trainings on topics 
166.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 103.73(A)(2) (West 2020). 
 167.  See id §§ 103.71–74; The Role of the CIIC, CORR. INST. INSPECTION COMM., 
http://www.ciic.state.oh.us/charge/index.html [https://perma.cc/JAQ5-J72J]. 
168.  GOV. BAR R. X § 3(A); see also Continuing Legal Education, OHIO SUP. CT., 
http://supremecourt.ohio.gov/AttySvcs/CLE/default.asp [https://perma.cc/YFL2-QDCG]. 
169.  GOV. BAR R. X § 1(A). 
170.  Id. § 3(B)(4)(d). 
 171.  See Transcript of Proceedings on Motions, at 250–51, State v. Pickens, No. B-0905088 
(Hamilton Com. Pl., Mar. 22, 2010) (defense counsel agreed to the removal of prospective jurors with 
felony convictions before voir dire, stating that “ they would be excused anyway so we would agree 
they should be excused.”). 
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such as “public trust and confidence in the judicial system and the 
perception of justice in Ohio” and “[a]ssuring fairness in matters of 
race,”172 given the disproportionate impact of felon exclusion laws on 
African-American men, as noted above. 
VI. CONCLUSION
Jury service is an integral part of American citizenship and American 
criminal justice, both for those convicted of felonies who wish to serve, 
as well as for those defendants seeking to preserve their rights to due 
process, equal protection, and to be tried before a fair cross section of their 
community, as required by the U.S. Constitution. As the Ohio General 
Assembly has granted the right to serve on a jury to those convicted of a 
felony upon the completion of any imposed parole or community control 
sanctions, it is incumbent upon the courts and other legal institutions to 
educate ex-offenders, attorneys, judges, court personnel, and other 
relevant parties about these rights and responsibilities. 
As noted above, there are viable solutions available to address these 
concerns, including trainings, updated institutional rules, and potentially 
formal legal action. Such actions are necessary to fortify the public trust 
and confidence in the judicial system and the perception of justice in Ohio. 
In order for the Ohio justice system to retain perceived legitimacy 
regarding juror selection, it must at minimum ensure that existing laws on 
juror eligibility are properly understood and enforced—a requirement it 
has so far failed to meet with any consistency. 
172.  GOV. BAR R. X § 3(B)(4)(d). 
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